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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GINA M. ARNOLD, and CHARLIE S.
ARNOLD,
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
Per Court Order of 2/2/09
vs.
DAVID GRIGSBY, M.D.; GARY B.
WHITE, M.D.; and UINTAH BASIN
MEDICAL CENTER,

CaseNo.20080255-SC

Defendants and Appellants.

Plaintiffs / Appellees Gina and Charlie Arnold hereby submit the following
supplemental briefing as requested in the Court's order of February 2, 2009.
INTRODUCTION
Oral argument on certiorari was held in this case on February 2, 2009. During the
proceeding, the Court inquired sua sponte about certain language in the out-of-state
tolling statute, (now codified as) Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-104. As the issue had not
previously been raised, counsel was limited in her ability to provide a substantive
response. The Court subsequently issued an Order that stated:

The parties, in their arguments and briefing, as well as the trial court and
court of appeals in their decisions in this case, have apparently relied upon the
presumed applicability of Section 78-12-35 of the Utah Code (recodified as 78B2-104) to the limitation expressed in Section 78-14-4 (now 78B-3-404). The
parties disagree upon the correct interpretation of 78-14-4, and the consequences
that arise under those differing interpretations when 78-12-35 is considered, but it
is unclear whether or not they disagree that 78-12-35 is to be considered as
applicable in the first instance.
To assist the court in fully evaluating the proper interpretation and
application of 78-14-4, the parties are requested to submit supplemental briefs on
the following question:
In what way, if any, does the language of Section 78-12-35 limit its
application to the provisions of Section 78-14-4?
As discussed below, appellees respectfully disagree with the premise that it is
unclear whether the parties disagree as to the applicability of Section 78-12-35 in the first
instance. Throughout three and a half years of trial court and appellate briefing, appellant
Grigsby has raised various arguments as to why he considered Section 78-12-35
inapplicable, but none of those arguments has ever involved the referenced language of
Section 78-12-35. Under these circumstances, including the fact that this matter is on
certiorari, appellees respectfully submit that any new argument by Appellants as to
inapplicability has long since been waived. {See Point III, infra)
In response to the Court's request, however, appellees hereby submit the following
analysis of the referenced language in Section 78-12-35. As set forth below, the history
and structure of the statute, legislative history of its 1987 amendment, and principles of
statutory construction all support the conclusion that the out-of-state tolling provision
applies to all statutes of limitation in Utah, including medical malpractice actions.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE PORTION OF SECTION 78-12-35 APPLICABLE TO A POSTACCRUAL DEPARTURE DOES NOT CONTAIN THE REFERENCED
LANGUAGE.
As an initial matter, appellees note that Section 78-12-35 contains two independent

sentences, which by their terms address two materially distinct situations. The first
sentence addresses situations in which a defendant is out of state when a claim accrues:
If a cause of action accrues against a person while the person is out of the state, the
action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his
return to the state.
That did not occur in this case. The second sentence addresses the situation
presented here, in which a defendant departs the state after a cause of action has accrued.
The second sentence, unlike the first, does not include the language "as limited by this
chapter." It says only: "If after a cause of action accrues the person departs from the
state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the
action." The wording of this sentence is similar to that of other tolling provisions. See,
e.g., §§ 78B-2-105 (effect of death), 78B-2-106 (effect of death outside the state), 78B-2107 (effect of war), etc. By its own terms, therefore, the language referenced in the
Court's Order is not part of the operative portion of the statute, which is that portion
applicable to defendants who depart the state after a claim arises.1

1

Courts similarly appear to distinguish between the two sentences, focusing on the
second sentence when a defendant has departed from the state after a cause of action
accrues. See, e.g., Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285, 286 (Utah 1997); Ankers v. Rodman, 995
F. Supp. 1329,1331 (D. Utah 1997).
3

In any event, as discussed below, it does not appear that the legislature intended
even the first sentence to preclude application of the out-of-state tolling provision to
statutory causes of action.
II.

THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 78-12-35 [78B-2-104]
APPLIES TO ALL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, INCLUDING
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES.

Generally, the purpose of statutes of limitation is to "encourage promptness in the
prosecution of actions and thus avoid the injustice which may result from the prosecution
of stale claims. Statutes of limitations attempt to protect against the difficulties caused by
lost evidence, faded memories and disappearing witnesses." Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285,
291 (Utah 1997).
The legislature has provided certain exceptions to statutes of limitations that serve
their own beneficial purposes. One such exception is the tolling of statutes of limitations
when a defendant departs the state after a cause of action accrues. The purpose of
Section 78-12-35 [78B-2-104] is to "prevent a defendant from depriving a plaintiff of the
opportunity of suing him by absenting himself from the state during the period of
limitation." Snyder v. dune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915, 916 (1964).
In light of the historical backdrop of this statute, the case law, and its purpose, it is
evident that the 1987 amendments to Section 78, one of which changed the wording in
the first sentence of Section 78-12-35, were not intended to, and did not, exempt an entire
field of causes of action from operation of the out-of-state tolling provision.
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A.

Legislative History of Section 78-12-35 f78B-2-1041 supports the
proposition that "as limited by this chapter" does not limit the applicability
of that sentence to only those statutes of limitations found in that chapter.

A similar version of the out-of-state tolling provision has existed in this state since
at least 1876. In that year, the statute said:
If, where the cause of action shall accrue against a person, he is out of the
Territory, the action may be commenced within the term herein limited, after his
return to the Territory; and if after the cause of action shall have accrued, he depart
the Territory, the time of his absence shall not be part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action."
Compiled Laws of Utah 1876, § 1117.
At that time, the Compiled Laws of Utah had all the statutes of limitation within
one title. Compiled Laws of Utah 1876, title XVIII, ch. 1-4. There is thus no question
that the legislature intended the provision to apply to all causes of action. Over the years,
the wording changed slightly (e.g., from "Territory" to "state"), but the phrase "herein
limited" remained.
Meanwhile, the code expanded (most dramatically with the recodifications of
1953), and the legislature began placing statutes of limitations in other locations in the
code. Presently, instead of all statutes of limitations being located in one title, more than
a dozen titles contain statutes of limitation for civil actions.
In 1987, Sen. Lyle Hillyard proposed a bill that modified various provisions in
Title 78. Most of the changes were technical or stylistic, an attempt to modernize the
code by, for example, replacing archaic "hereins" with plainer language. One of these
stylistic changes was the replacement of "as limited herein" in the second sentence of
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Section 78-12-35 [78B-2-104] with "as limited by this chapter." Laws of Utah 1987, ch.
19, §4.
The present statute reads:
If a cause of action accrues against a person while the person is out of the state, the
action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his
return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues the person departs from the
state, the time of his absence is no part of the time limited for the commencement
of the action.
As demonstrated by the legislative history of Sen. Hillyard's bill, there was no
intent to make substantive changes to Title 78 by this change in wording. In floor
debates, Sen. Hillyard said that the purpose of his bill was three fold: First, to eliminate
the tolling of statutes of limitation for persons while they are incarcerated; second, to
redefine insanity so as to toll statutes of limitations based upon mental incompetence; and
third, to reduce the statute of limitations for civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
from four years to two. See Utah Senate Floor Debate, Jan. 16, 1987 (attached hereto as
Exhibit A). The same three purposes were stated in the House of Representatives floor
debate. See Utah House Floor Debate, Jan. 28, 1987 (attached hereto as Exhibit B).
No mention was made of a sweeping change to eliminate the applicability of the
longstanding out-of-state tolling provision to an entire class of claims, ie.9 every cause of
action for which the statute of limitations is stated outside of Title 78. Nor was any
2

Another change was to separate the statute into two individual sentences. As stated
above, appellees do not believe that any substantive changes to Section 78-12-35 were
intended by the legislation. However, if appellee Grigsby argues that substantive changes
were so intended, the separation of the statute into two discrete sentences must also be
deemed substantive.
6

mention made of an intent to exempt medical malpractice claims from the tolling
provision. Indeed, the only reference to medical malpractice claims in thefloordebates
occurred when Sen. Hillyard affirmatively cited medical malpractice claims to illustrate
how the discovery rule would work in a civil rights case. See Exhibit A, pp. 4-5, 8.3
Considering the stated purpose of the amendment as well as the changes made to
this particular provision, it appears that the changes to Section 78-12-35 [78B-2-104]
were stylistic, not substantive. For instance, instead of "[i]f when a cause of action
accrues ..." as found in the earlier version, the amended statute reads, "[i]f a cause of
action accrues . . . . " Additionally, instead of "against a person when he is out of the state
..." the amended statute says, "against a person while the person is out of the state

"

(Emphasis added). The change from "herein limited" to "as limited by this chapter" was
similarly stylistic, especially considering that the name of "this chapter" is "Statutes of
Limitation."

3

[Sen. Hillyard]: "Number one, your statute of limitations does not start to run until you
either know or should know of your cause of action. I hate to bring in medical
malpractice because that will get Senator Barlow's attention, but in a medical malpractice
case, for example, if an instrument is left in your body and you don't know about it, then
the statute of limitations doesn't run until you either know about that being left in your
body or have good reason to know. The same thing with a civil rights violation
In
my same medical malpractice case, that's always really been the law, is when you should
have known."
7

B.

Principles of statutory construction further support the conclusion that
Section 78-12-35 [78B-2-104] applies to medical malpractice cases.

As the Court of Appeals has noted, the state legislature has made it clear that if it
wishes to exclude a statute of limitation from the tolling statute, it will do so with "clear,
explicit language." Bonneville Asphalt v. Labor Comm % 2004 UT App 137, % 8, 91 P.3d
849, 852 (Utah App. 2004). In this case, there is no "clear, explicit language" that says
the out-of-state tolling statute does not apply to medical malpractice claims, which would
have been easy to do.
Furthermore, a well-accepted maxim of statutory construction is that "expression
unius est exclusion alterius," the expression of one thing is evidence of the exclusion of
the other. See, e.g., Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, f 30, 104 P.3d 1208
("statutory construction presumes that the expression of one should be interpreted as the
exclusion of another.") In this case, the state legislature chose to overrule a ruling by this
Court regarding minors, and to expressly state that the two-year malpractice statute of
limitations applies without regard for minority or legal disability under nearby Section
78-12-36 [78B-2-108]. (See merits briefs.) Significantly, the legislature did not take the
additional (major) step of exempting all tolling provisions.
Absent explicit language exempting medical malpractice cases from the out-ofstate tolling statute, and in light of the legislature's specific reference to a neighboring
statute, it is again evident that it was not the intent of the state legislature to exclude
application of Section 78-12-35 [78B-2-104] to medical malpractice cases.
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C.

The statutes of limitation found outside of Section 78-12 [78B-2] are
indistinguishable from those within, and no rational basis has been
demonstrated for treating them differently.

As mentioned, there are statutes of limitations located throughout the Utah Code.
There is no reasonable argument why the legislature would intend to exempt these claims
from tolling when a defendant departs from the state. Statutes of limitations located
outside of Section 78-12 [78B-2] include, among others: (1) liability to third parties
under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (§32A- 14a-102(7)); (2) deceptive trade
practices under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (§13-11-17; (3) discrimination
under the Utah Fair Housing Act (§57-21-12); (4) product liability actions under the Utah
Product Liability Act (§78B-6-706); (5) misappropriation under the Uniform Trade Secret
Act (§13-24-7); (6) wiretapping under the Interception of Communications Act (§77-23a11); (7) private racketeering actions (§76-10-1065); and, of course, medical malpractice.
There is no indication that the legislature intended, essentially sub silentio, to treat
defendants in these types of claims more favorably than other defendants. As noted
above, the purpose of Section 78-12-35 [78B-2-104], is to "prevent a defendant from
depriving a plaintiff of the opportunity of suing him by absenting himself from the state
during the period of limitation." Snyder, 390 P.2d at 916. That purpose applies equally to
statutory claims.
Put simply, there is no reason to conclude that the legislature intended to permit
tolling of the statute of limitations in claims for negligence, breach of contract, assault,
wrongful death, trespass to real property, etc., but not in claims for product liability,

9

medical malpractice, wiretapping, racketeering, etc. The out-of-state tolling provision is,
as it always has been, intended to apply to statutory causes of action.4
III.

APPELLEE GRIGSBY WAIVED ANY ARGUMENT THAT
SECTION 78-12-35 [78b-2-104] DOES NOT APPLY TO MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS BECAUSE OF ITS WORDING BY
FAILING TO RAISE THIS ARGUMENT AT ANY POINT IN THE
TRIAL COURT OR APPELLATE PROCESS.

As noted in the introduction, litigation of this single issue has consumed more than
three and a half years. Grigsby filed his initial motion for summary judgment in
September 2005. In that motion, Grigsby argued that Section 78-12-35 did not apply to
medical malpractice claims for various reasons, all of which centered on the language of
Section 78-14-4. The trial court granted Grigsby's motion based upon the arguments
raised by the parties.
The Arnolds sought Rule 54(b) certification from the trial court. The Court of
Appeals reversed, again based upon the arguments raised by the parties. While Grigsby
again argued to the Court of Appeals that Section 78-12-35 (the tolling statute) did not

4

Appellees note that Section 78-12 [78B-2] does contain language relating to medical
malpractice. It appears that the section appears to have two types of provisions,
preliminary and substantive. The preliminary sections include topics such as the effect of
war (§ 78B-2-107), death (§ 78B-2-105), disability (§ 78B-2-108), injunction (§ 78B-2112), etc. The substantive sections include specific statutes of limitations for causes of
action. Included in the preliminary sections is a provision that provides for a separate trial
in medical malpractice cases in which the statute of limitation is at issue. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-114. The fact that medical malpractice claims are mentioned in the same chapter
seems to militate further against a suggestion that the legislature intended to exempt such
claims from its provisions.
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apply to Section 78-14-4 (the medical malpractice statute), he did not present other
arguments for inapplicability, such as the referenced language of Section 78-12-35.
Grigsby then sought certiorari with this court, presenting the same arguments that
he had to the trial court and court of appeals. When the petition was granted, Grigsby
submitted two briefs on the merits to this Court that, again, raised no argument based
upon the language of Section 78-12-35.
In sum, Grigsby filed two memoranda in support of his motion for summary
judgment, filed a brief on the merits with the Court of Appeals, participated in oral
argument at the Court of Appeals, filed two briefs with this Court in support of his
petition for certiorari, filed two briefs on the merits with this Court, and participated in
oral argument before this Court, never once raising an argument based upon the language
of Section 78-12-35 referenced in this Court's order.
Although appellees believe that their construction of Section 78-12-35 [78B-2104] is correct, as a matter of waiver and basic fairness - to the trial court and Court of
Appeals, as well as the parties - the Court should not address any contrary argument by
Grigsby. Apart from avoiding the waste of judicial resources, the doctrine of wavier
serves many purposes. Parties and their lawyers rely on their opponents' arguments,
including their perceived strengths and weaknesses, in making basic decisions, from
evaluating settlement offers to assessing exposure to seeking Rule 54(b) certification, etc.
Accordingly, appellees respectfully request the Court to render its opinion in this matter
based upon the arguments raised and briefed by the parties throughout the case.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs/appellees submit that the language in
Section 78-12-35 referenced in this Court's order of February 2,2009, does not limit its
application to Section 78-14-4, and should not affect the outcome of this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Sfc^day of March, 2009.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

Roger P. Chrisfteiigen
Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Appellees Arnold
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the

day of March, 2009, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING was mailed,first-classpostage prepaid, to:
Larry R. White
950 Gateway Tower West
15 West South Temple
Salt Lake City UT 84101
Attorneys for Appellee Grigsby
Stephen W. Owens
10 West 100 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City UT 84101
Phillip R. Fishier
Strong & Hanni
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City UT 8 4180
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Exhibit A

Senate Bill 26
House Floor Debate
28 January 1967

Debra A. Dibble; C.S.R., R.P-R-

witness

*

date

P R O C E E D I N G S
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE:

Senate Bill No. 26.

Statute of limitations reform by Lyle W.
Hillyard (inaudible) legislature of the State of Utah.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE:

Thank you.

Senator Wilson.
SENATOR WILSON:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

This bill deals with some uncertainty that
presently exists in the Statute of Limitations section
of the Utah law.
What we have is different categories for
certain actions (inaudible), and it limits the time in
which one may bring a cause of action if it's in that
particular category.
They range from one year up to seven years,
and eight years in the case of judgement.
Presently, the Federal civil rights law
actions are brought under the Utah Statute of
Limitations because there is no Federal -- that that
statute limitations (inaudible) case.

And there's some

confusion on which one of the categories this would fit
in.
For example, in the two-year limitation,
it f s considered an assault on a police officer, but, in
fact, an assault on a police officer may be a civil
2

witness

* date

rights action.
Also, assault and battery is a one-year
limitation in the (inaudible).
Now,

therefs a catch-all phrase in the

four-year period that says any actions for which there
has not been a specific time designated, they would fit
into that.

So the courts have generally put them in

the four-year statute of limitations category.
And what this does is clarify it by putting
it in the two-year.
It doesn't just (inaudible) a couple of
other things.

It changes the word insane to mentally

incompetent, and it deals with the elimit -elimination of imprisonment as being a period of time
when the statute would not run.
And typically, and historically, when one
has been incarcerated, he does not have access to
lawyers or information concerning his rights.
As most of you will be aware of, that has
(inaudible) being perhaps some of the best informed as
to their legal rights are those who are incarcerated.
And so it eliminates that as an exception, which would
toll or stop the running of the statute of limitations.
It does leave intact the one who is not of
reached legal age, or one who is mentally incompetent,
3

witness

* date

1

and the statute o f limitations would not run until they

1

either become of age or their competency is

1

reestablished.
It does have an effect of applying only to

1

causes of action that are (inaudible) as of the

1

effective date of the bill, so it does not interfere

1

with anyone who may have a cause of action pending,

1

those not actuall y filed yet, and may become along a

1

longer period of appeal.

1

U

1

I'd be happy to answer any questions.

1

Those who wish to speak to the bill.

1

Seeing none, Senator Wilson, prepare to sum

1

P•
SENATOR WILSON:

I111 waive summation.

SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE:
1

Summation has been

waived.
Voting is open on Senate Bill 26.

1

Voting is closed on Senate Bill 26.

1

Senate Bill 26, having received 65

1

affirmative votes and no negative votes, has passed

1

this house •
Before the vote Senate Bill 26 was

1

publically read by (inaudible) and immediately

1

thereafter signed by the Speaker of the House in the

1

presence o f the House, over which he presides and the

1
4

witness

* date

(inaudible) 28th day of January, 1987.
(Whereupon, the recording
was concluded.)

*

*

*

\18:11:00
118:11:03

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)
)

ss

I, Debra A. Dibble, Registered Professional
Reporter for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that
the foregoing transcript was taken down by me
stenographically from electronically recorded tapes and
thereafter transcribed under my direction.
That the foregoing pages contain a true and
accurate transcript of the electronically recorded
proceedings, or requested portions thereof, and was
transcribed by me to the best of my ability from the
tapes given me.

Debra A. Dibble, CSR, RPR
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Exhibit B

Senate Bill 26
Senate Floor Debate
16 January 1967
*

* *

Debra A. Dibble; C.S.R., R.P.R.

Senate Bill 26 *

Senate Floor Debate

PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN:
third reading calendar.
CLERK:

*

16 January 1987

We'll move to our

Senate Bill 26.

Senate Bill No. 26, statute of

limitations reform by Senator Hillyard.
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN:
MR. HILLYARD:

Senator Hillyard?

Thank you, Mr. President.

We talked about this yesterday, and very
briefly, it does three things.

It does away with the

tolling of the statute of limitations for someone in
prison;
and number two it redefines insanity to say
it is tolled during mental incompetency;
and number three, it clarifies the statute
of limitations for civil rights actions under Section
1983,

and puts it clearly at two years.
I'd be glad to respond to any questions you

may have on that.
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN:
SENATOR FARLEY:

Senator Farley?

Mr. President, I have some

concern over the -- the limitation of the statute.
Limitation of the time on civil rights matters.
And I am looking for the place in the bill
so that I can amend that to -- to the four years.
My motion is -Do you -- do you know where the line is,
2

Senate Bill 26 * Senate Floor Debate

1

* 16 January 1987

Senator Hillyard?
I know it's not fair to ask you to help me

1

amend your bill.
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN:

If that's what you

1

want to do, then you'd strictly move to bracket the

1

language from the bill on page two, beginning on line
19

1

— excuse me, line 17, through page three, on line

four.
And the reason being, is that -- is you

1

would not obviously want to change the two years on

1

line 19, for the other actions.

1

out --

You just want to take

Or I guess the other thing you could bracket
1

on page three, lines three and four, so we don't have

1

a -- a definition.
You'd have to put it in the other section,
that talks about the four-year statute of limitations,
rather than this section, which only talks about a

1

two-year.
SENATOR FARLEY:

So my motion would be,

Senat or Hillyard, to delete line 19.
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN:

1

No, I think the

bette r way would be probably on page three, brackets

1

lines three and four.

1

SENATOR FARLEY:

All right.

I move to
3

Senate Bill 26 * Senate Floor Debate

*

16 January 1987

1

bracket on page three, lines three and four.

1

will leave the -- the limitation to four years, rather

1

than changing it to two.
SENATOR HILLYARD:

Which

I think most attorneys

1

would aceept that it currently is four , although there

1

is -SENATOR FARLEY:

-- the maj ority of people

1

do not really understand what their civil rights are.

1

And I think that two years is of -- is a very brief

1

period.
The learning could occur later than that,

1

and I wouId prefer to see that at four years -- which

1

is where we are now -- than to reduce that time to two

1

years.
I ask the body to consider that amendment.
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN:

Discussion to the

amendment 9
Senator Hillyard.
SENATOR HILLYARD:

I would make just to

1

responses to that.
Number one, your statute of limitations does

1

not start to run until you either know or should know

1

of your cause of action.
I hate to bring in medical malpractice

1

because that will get Senator Barlow's attention, but

1

4

Senate Bill 26 * Senate Floor Debate

*

16 January 1987

in a medical malpractice case, for example, if an
instrument is left in your body and you don't know
about it, then the statute of limitations doesn't run
until you either know about that being left in your
body or have good reason to know.
The same thing with a civil rights
violation.

It may occur and you not know about it, the

statute of limitations doesn't run until you know or
should know.
So that part of your concern, Senator
Farley, I don't think is really meritorious for
changing it.
I think the other point about the policy
consideration, I would just say this.
Most intentional torts -- and that's where
you know and you go out and hit somebody, or you do
something like that, purposely, and that's what the
civil rights violation has to be, is some kind of a -it can't be mere negligence, is a shorter period than
ordinary negligence.

And that's where the definition

came .
My -- and I -- and I -- of course I guess
people say it's strange for a lawyer to be shorting the
period of limitations, but I think in this particular
case, in civil rights, where it's -- if the -- it is
5

Senate Bill 26 * Senate Floor Debate

*

16 January 1987

clearly a violation of the Federal Law, and number two,
you can recover attorney fees if you can show a
violation, and other (inaudible) can be brought, I
think making it very clear that as a two-year statute
is really a protection of everyone involved.
There's -- and I say most attorneys would
concede it's four years, but there's an argument it
could only be one year, because there's a one-year
statute of limitations on assault and battery.

And I

think we've clearly made it so that everyone knows, and
put on notice, and two years is certainly a reasonable
time to bring that when you know or should have known
of the injury.
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN:
SENATOR BLACK:

Senator Black?

I'll yield to Senator

Renstrom.
SENATOR RENSTROM:

Question.

How are other

states treating this?
Are they doing -- going with one, two, four,
six,

or -SENATOR HILLYARD:

I'm not really aware of

what other states have done, because other states have
a different statute of limitations.

For example, the

time period, I know is shorter in -- in Idaho than it
is in Utah for a negligence case.
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And so I don't think what other states in
particular have done may have been or not, other than
our state should make a clear policy statement of two
years, which, again, (inaudible) considerations, and I
think I -- as a has lawyer said, there are separate
issues on both sides.

I think two years is a

reasonable adjustment.
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN:

Further discussion

of the amendment?
Senator Farley?
SENATOR FARLEY:

You'd like to sum up?
Well, I'd also like to ask

a question.
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN:
SENATOR FARLEY:
What is the rush?

Okay.

Of Senator Hillyard.
I mean, what's -- what

is the evidence that you have that indicates that this
is a problem?

If -- is it an MDR statement that --

that people should -- should know or should have
known -- should have known is a pretty big loophole.
People maybe should have known and don't know, but if
they find out, it's too bad to have lost their rights.
And we've been operating with a four-year -substantially with a four-year period.

What is it

that -- that -- that has -- what's the problem that is
so great that we have to limit people's rights to be
7
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heard on civil rights infractions?
SENATOR HILLYARD:

The answer to that

question is; number one, should have known as always
been the standard.

In my same medical malpractice

case, that's always really been the law, is when you
should have known.
But number two, what's really brought this
to a head is that there's been a lot of argument and
debate back and forth.

I think many lawyers thought,

in Utah, it was one year, on assault and battery.
If a police officer stopped a suspect it a
scene of a crime and there was a -- acute beating,
then -- that pretty well concede it's one year,and then
the two-year on the false arrest.
But there was a very recent, within the last
couple of years, the Supreme -- or Tenth Circuit
decision that through that all in a mess and said, no,
it's really four years, even though it's not a
negligence.
And I know I filed a bill, last session, to
do this, and near the end of the session when the
Supreme Court decision came down, and we were just
caught in the crunch and didn't have a chance to look
at it.
We did look at it during the judiciary, and
8
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1

during the interim, and again, there were some other

1

issues involved in it, of a statute of limitations

1

period, and they felt that this one needs to be clearly

1

to the fore, because of the proliferation of the civil

1

rights actions that are being filed, especially in our

1

prison, and secondly in the light of the Tenth Circuit

1

within the last year or two.
SENATOR FARLEY:

1

I'm willing to summarize

now, Mr. President.
It seems to me that without knowing what's

1

happening in other states, without knowing what the

1

consensus is around the country on what is an

1

appropriate period for civil rights violations, and

1

because we've been managing fairly well without any

1

1

obvious difficulties, that -- that there's nothing that

1

1

sounds to me as if it's caused a great deal of trouble,

1

1

it appears to me that we ought to come down on the side

1

1

of the people, and allow them to have the four years in

1

1

which to -- to determine that they -- that their civil

1

1

rights have been violated.

1

I -- I ask you to vote for the amendment

1

that I have proposed.

1

Thank you.

1

PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN:
amendment.

My question on the

Those in favor the amendment say aye.

1
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(Ayes heard.)
Opposed, no?
(Nos heard.)
Amendment fails.
SENATOR FARLEY:

I'd like to have a -- a

roll call on that motion.
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN:

Roll call is

requested.
SENATOR FARLEY:

Well, standing vote would

be fine.
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN:

Standing vote.

Those in favor stand.
One,

two, three, four, five, six, seven,

eight, nine.
Opposed?
One,

two, three, four, five, six, seven,

eight, nine, ten, eleven, 12, 13, 14.
The vote was properly tabulated.
Further discussion on the bill?
SENATOR HILLYARD:

Seeing that,

Mr. President, I'd call for a passage of -- that Senate
Bill 26 be considered for the last third for final
passage.
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN:

The question has

been called for.
10

Senate Bill 26 * Senate Floor Debate

*

16 January 1987

1

The question is, shall Senate Bill 26 pass?

1

CLERK:

1
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Senator Bangerter?
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1
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1
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CLERK: Black?
1
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1
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1
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1
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1
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1
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1
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1

Hillyard?
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